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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we propose a five-step approach to detect obfuscated malware by investigating the structural and 
behavioural features of API calls.  We have developed a fully automated system to disassemble and extract API 
call features effectively from executables. Using n-gram statistical analysis of binary content, we are able to 
classify if an executable file is malicious or benign.  Our experimental results with a dataset of 242 malwares 
and 72 benign files have shown a promising accuracy of 96.5% for the unigram model.  We also provide a 
preliminary analysis by our approach using support vector machine (SVM) and by varying n-values from 1 to 5, 
we have analysed the performance that include accuracy, false positives and false negatives.  By applying SVM, 
we propose to train the classifier and derive an optimum n-gram model for detecting both known and unknown 
malware efficiently. 
 
Keywords: Code obfuscation, Feature extraction, Malware, n-gram, SVM.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Malicious software (Malware) (McGraw & Morrisett, 2000) affects the secrecy and integrity of data as well as 
the control flow and functionality of a computer system (Alazab et al., 2009a; Sulaiman et al., 2005). Recent 
attacks using obfuscated malicious codes (previously unknown malware) have resulted in disruption of services 
leading towards huge financial and legal implications (Alazab et al., 2009a; Keizer, 2009) (Alazab et al., 2009b; 
Sharif et al., 2008).  Therefore, researchers and anti-malware vendors are faced with the challenge of how to 
detect such zero day attacks (unknown malwares), which is also a major concern for various computer user 
groups, including home, business and even government users. Literature studies (Christodorescu and Jha, 2003; 
2004; Vinod et al., 2009) on malware detection have shown that there is no single technique that could detect all 
types of malware. However, there are two techniques commonly used for malware detection, signature-based 
detection and anomaly-based detection.  Anti-malware engines use signatures or 'byte sequence' to detect known 
malware. These signatures are created by disassembling the file and selecting some pieces of unique code. 
Hence, signature-based detection is very effective for known malware but the major drawback is the inability to 
detect new, unknown malicious code that result in zero day attacks (Sharif et al., 2008). On the other hand, 
anomaly-based detection, which is a technique that uses the knowledge of what constitutes normal behaviour to 
decide the maliciousness of a program code, has the key advantage and ability to detect zero day attacks.  
Current anomaly-based techniques use heuristics approach of detection that is inefficient and usually resulting in 
false positives (Vinod et al., 2009). In this paper, we propose a novel approach to extract the structural and 
behavioural features from program codes to detect both known and unknown malware. 
 
Windows API calling sequence reflects the behaviour of a particular piece of code (Wang et al., 2009). API 
enables the programs to exploit the power of the operating system and the malware authors are taking this 
advantage to make use of the API calls as a vehicle to perform malicious actions. However, Malware writers 
make use of Application Program Interface (API) calls as a vehicle to inflict systems and to evade from anti-
virus (AV) scanners through code obfuscation.  Our novel technique of extracting the structural and behavioural 
features of API calls with the aid of statistical n-gram analysis has resulted in effective malware detection. An n-
gram is an n-contiguous sequence the main used is for pattern recognition. It has been used and applied 
successfully in many areas of computer science applications such as Computer Speech Recognition (Lee and 
Kawahara, 2009), Language Identification (Choong et al., 2009), Spelling Correction (Bergsma et al., 2009), 
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Optical Character Recognition (OCR) (Schambach, 2009), Authorship Analysis (Layton et al., 2009) etc. An n-
gram method of feature extraction and analysis is quite thorough but time consuming as the size of n increases.  
To overcome this constraint, we propose an intelligent machine learning technique of feature recognition to train 
a classifier for identifying malicious code. Literature studies indicate that a predominantly used machine 
learning technique called, Support Vector Machines (SVMs) for pattern recognition has been applied 
successfully to classify text, handwritings (Bergsma et al., 2009; Choong et al., 2009) and the like.  Since 
malwares also exhibit the behaviour patterns in the form of a fileprint or feature, this work applies SVM for 
effectively classifying the program code as either malicious or benign. 
 
CURRENT MALWARE DETECTORS 
 
Malware detectors are used to scan a computer system to identify malware, with the main purpose of preventing 
it from adversely affecting the system. The current malware detection methods usually rely on existing malware 
signatures with limited heuristics and are unable to detect those malware that can hide itself during the scanning 
process (Venkatraman, 2009) and those malware that apply spohisticated obfuscation techniques. An anti-virus 
(AV) engine must perform 3 main tasks to protect computers: Scanning, Detection, Removal (Microsoft, 2007). 
A Malware detector D is defined as a function whose determine the exactable program (p) which program is 
malicious or benign D: P → {malicious, benign}. Modern and traditional anti-malwares scan the programs (p) in 
a system for a byte sequence or malware signature (s) which it stored in the database engine.  If the signature is 
found in the program (p), it will be identified as a malware, otherwise it is declared as benign, and this is 
represented in the equation below. 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) 
 
 
 
The malware signature is a byte sequence that uniquely identifies a specific malware (Vinod et al., 2009). 
Typically, a malware detector uses the malware signature to identify the malware like a fingerprint. Most AV 
engines are supplied with a database containing information of existing malware to identify maliciousness, by 
looking for code signatures or byte sequences while scanning the system. A malware detector scans the system 
in various locations for characteristic byte sequences or signature (s) that match with the one in the database and 
declares existence of malware blocking its access to the system. The signature matching process is called 
signature-based detection and most traditional AV engines use this method. It is a very efficient and effective 
method to detect known malware. But, the major drawback is the inability to detect new or unknown malicious 
code and zero day attacks. Therefore, updating the detection engine or AV software daily with latest malware 
signatures is essential so as to protect the computer system against all known malware. Hence, the more 
malware signatures (s) are fed into the AV engine, the more effective it is in detecting latest known malwares. 
 
The new threat for computers is that the malware writers are recycling existence malware like w32.Parite 
(Microsoft, 2010) with different signatures (‘byte sequence') by using obfuscation techniques such as packing, 
polymorphic transformations and metamorphic obfuscations, instead of creating an entirely new malware. This 
means that the AV scanners will not be able to detect these new malware due to the non-existence of their 
fingerprints in the signature database. Hence, there is a need to capture the behaviour of malware based on 
anomalies or behavioural patterns exhibited by such hidden malware, which is the main focus of this research 
work. 
 
The results of the following recent studies have been the prime motivation for this research:  
 
1) malware authors are able to easily fool the detection engine by applying obfuscation techniques on known 
malwares (Sharif et al., 2008), 
2) identifying benign files as malware is becoming very high (Keizer, 2009) (Yegneswaran et al., 2005) (false 
positive),  
3) failing to detect obfuscated malware is high (false negative) (Paul, 2008),  
4) the current detection rate is decreasing (Symantec, 1997), and  
5) current malware detectors are unable to detect zero day attacks (McGraw & Morrisett, 2000).  
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Code obfuscation is a challenge for digital forensic examiners (Alazab et al., 2009a) with the limitations of 
signature based detection (Christodorescu and Jha, 2003). As a first step to address these issues, in this paper, 
we propose a five-step approach of anomaly based detection that captures  and analyses the structural and 
behavioural features of application programming interface (API) calls from program codes or executables using 
n-gram and SVM to detect and classify even unknown malware. In our previous work (Alazab et al., 2010), we 
have automated the entire process of effectively extracting the behaviour features of application programming 
interface (API) calls of the core of Windows operating system. The fully-automated system processes both 
packed and unpacked portable execution (PE) files and performs reverse obfuscation. This paper is an 
enhancement to the previous work. We further extract the n-gram distributions of all the API call features from 
the malicious and benign executables and apply SVM for machine learning. We first extract the most frequently 
occurring n-grams in each file and collate that list into an overall list for the entire dataset. and then collect the 
n-gram distribution for each executable for each n-gram in the larger list. We apply principle component 
analysis (PCA) approach to the result to account for 95% of the variation and for an effective feature reduction 
process.  With the extracted features, our main goal of detecting unknown malware is now possible if our 
approach caters to all possible code obfuscations techniques that could be adopted by the malware authors. The 
next section describes the commonly used code obfuscation techniques that are addressed in this research work. 
 
CODE OBFUSCATION TECHNIQUES 
 
In order to evade detection by AV engines, malware authors are applying obfuscating techniques (Alazab, 2009) 
such as packing (Guo et al., 2008), polymorphism (Stepan, 2005) and metamorphism (Bruschi et al., 2006) in 
order to transform existing malware. Metamorphic and polymorphic malware transformed malcode into a new 
code without affecting the original functionality or purpose so that the AV engine’s scanning process skips the 
detection of the signature. 
 
Malware authors are continually developing new techniques for creating and applying obfuscation techniques 
T(P) on a malware program (p) to produce an obfuscated program (p'), thereby making it very difficult to 
reserve engineer and decipher the signature successfully, even though the two programs,  p and p' are having the 
same functionality and exhibit the same affect. On the other hand, since p and p' have different byte sequence, 
AV engines and reverse engineers are applying deobfuscation techniques D(p') on  the obfuscated program (p') 
in order to analyse the malware and to detect the malware as shown in figure 1. 
 
Packers are commonly used today for code obfuscation or compression. Packers are software programs that 
could be used to compress and encrypt the PE in secondary memory and to restore the original executable image 
when loaded into main memory (RAM). Malware authors do not need to change several lines of code to change 
the malware signature mainly because, changing any byte sequence in the PE results in a new different  byte 
sequence in the newly produced packed PE. 
  
Polymorphic malware uses encryption and data appending/ data pre-pending in order to change the body of the 
malware, and further, it changes decryption routines from infection to infection as long as the encryption keys 
change. This has led AV experts to develop different scanning techniques, from simple byte sequence matching 
to more complex techniques such as X-RAYING scanning (Perriot & Ferrie, 2004). In 2006 Symantec Internet 
Security Threat Report stated the detecting polymorphic Malware such as w32.Polip and w32.Detnat is much 
more difficult and complex than the other type of Malware (Turner, 2006). 
 
Metamorphic malware changes the code itself without the need of using encryption. In general, there are four 
techniques commonly used for metamorphic obfuscation. These are, i) Dead-code Insertion which is mean do 
nothing such as a sequence of NOPs (No Operation Performed),  ii) Code Transposition that changing the 
instructions such as using JMPs instructions so that the order of instructions is different than the original one, 
iii) Register Reassignment such as replacing push ebx with push eax to exchange register names, and iv) 
Instruction Substitution which is replace the instructions in to different instructions with the same result some 
authors uses a database dictionary of equivalent instruction sequences to make it easier and faster. 
 
In a nutshell, malware authors are continually developing such new techniques for creating malware that cannot 
be detected by AV engines, and their level of sophistication is continuing to grow. Through our experimental 
tests, we have found that all above techniques can be used to fool the current detection engines by obfuscating 
the malware signature. Hence, in order to cater to all the above mentioned obfuscation techniques, our research 
focuses on unpacking and extracting the behaviour of the malware through API call analysis rather than the 
typical "pattern matching" detection process that are evaded by obfuscations of the byte sequence through 
packing, metamorphic and polymorphic techniques. We identify the features of the extracted API calls in the 
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unpacked executable binary using the n-gram statistical analysis that is described in the next section. 
 
N-GRAMS 
 
An n-gram model, in simple terms, uses the statistical properties of n-grams for predicting the next item in a 
sequence. It is a subsequence of ‘n’ items from a given sequence. For this research, the items refer to the list of 
API calls within an executable file. An n-gram could be of different sizes: 'unigram' referred when the size is 
n=1; 'bigram' where the size is n= 2; size n=3 referred to "trigram; size (n−1) is termed “Markov model” and 
size n=4 or more is generally called 'n-gram'. Many disciplines have applied n-gram analysis as the model is 
efficient and successful in solving classification problems. In this paper, we apply n-grams to the problem of 
malware detection; by extracting the list of API calls contained within both packed the unpacked malware. A 
classifier is trained on the differences in n-gram distributions between malicious and benign executable files. 
 
Some studies have analysed 1-gram and 2-gram of ASCII byte values (Stolfo et al.,2006) and computed the 
frequency and variance of each gram. They observed that applying 'unigram' analysis to Portable Document 
Format (PDF) files embedded with malcode are pretty effective in malware detection when compared to the 
COTS AV scanners. However, such studies are limited to document files types and do not have sufficient 
resolution to include all class of file types. As the number of n-grams is going to be very large, feature selection 
measures such as ASCII, UNICODE, API and others are being adopted to yield better results. For the 
obfuscated malware detection problem, this work applies n-gram on API call based features.  We propose a five-
step approach that results in an effective n-gram feature extraction from API call sequences for classifying 
executables as malicious or benign with the use of Support Vector Machines (SVM) as the machine learning 
classifier.   
 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
This paper’s main contributions are four-fold as given below: 
 
 We have developed a fully-automated system to unpack, de-obfuscate and reverse engineer the program 
codes and apply feature extraction techniques effectively. 
  
 We have successfully used the system to extract  behaviour features of API calls that  relate to i) hooking of 
the system services, ii)  creating or modifying files, iii) getting information from the file for changing 
information about the DLLs loaded by the malware (Alazab et al., 2010),  and have extended the previous 
work done by the authors. 
 
 We have applied the n-gram statistical model to obtain the distribution of the executables for n-values 
ranging from 1 to 5.  We have measured the model based on factors such as accuracy, false positives and 
false negatives. 
 
 Our proposed approach also includes the use of SVM to train the classifier for machine learning and robust 
identification of malicious code as against benign code. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Obfuscation transformation 
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PROPOSED APPROACH AND IMPLEMENTATION 
 
Since majority of malware change their byte sequence or 'Signature' by applying obfuscation techniques to 
evade detection by virus scanners, we first unpack and de-obfuscate the executable using our fully-automated 
system (programmed in Python programming language).  The system uses existing tools such as SQLite (2010) 
plug-in with IDA pro Dissasembler (2009) to generate eight tables of information, namely Blocks, Functions, 
Instructions, Names, Maps, Stacks, Segments, TargetBinaries.  Each of these tables contains different 
information about the binary content.  Our premise is that Malware files and benign files have different uses and 
distributions for their of API function calls. Hence, we extract behaviour features from n-gram distributions.  
For the analysis of the features, we have also considered the machine opcodes that include direct and indirect 
calls such as Jump and Call operations as well as the function types (e.g. import).  Sample SQL command code 
snippets for feature extraction used the Python program are as shown below.   
 
 
 
As shown in figure 2, we initially extract the n-gram distribution from the dataset, train the SVM classifier with 
benign files and then test for malicious files for accurate identification of malware. We present the approach in 
the form of five steps given below: 
 
Step 1: Unpack the malware and disassemble the binary executable to retrieve the assembly program. 
 
For our implementation, we have used PEiD (2010) to unpack the binary executable. PEiD is commonly used 
for most common packers, cryptors, compilers and even signature-based packer detection in PE files. We then 
disassembled the code using Interactive Disassembler Pro (IDA Pro) as it automatically recognizes API calls for 
various compilers.   
 
Step 2: Extract API calls and important machine-code features from the assembly program. 
  
Our fully-automated system processes the outputs from Step 1 with the aid of SQLite and IDA pro to generate 
the database containing the application programming interface (API) calls (.idb) automatically from the entire 
dataset of malware and benign programs. API call features are extracted from the assembly code of the 
executables so that the generated information could be used for effective analysis.  
 
SELECT function_address,src_block_address,name  
from Maps, Names" 
Where (op='call' or op='jmp') and (type='import' or type='function') 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2  Fully-automated architecture to distribute the API function calls 
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Step 3:  Map the API calls with MSDN library and analyse. 
 
Using the downloaded Windows API from Microsoft Developer Network (MSDN) (2010) our automated 
system compares and matches API calls outputted from Step 2 with the look-up table of API libraries from 
MSDN.  
 
For the analysis, we consider extracted features such as frequency of call, call sequence pattern and actions 
immediately preceding or after the call. We considered specific actions that lead to invalid memory references 
or undefined registers or invalid target jumps for refining the extracted API call features. 
 
Step 4:  Extract binary N-gram features. 
 
To extract the n-gram distributions of all of the malicious and benign executables, we first count the frequency 
of each n-gram within the entire corpus. Once that has been completed, we reduce this list to the top 100 most 
frequent n-grams. The above procedure is replicated for n values between 1 and 5 inclusive. 
 
Step 5: Train a classifier and build a model using support vector machine (SVM).  
 
SVMs have performed well on traditional text classification tasks, and on executable files. The supervised 
learning SVM method is a reliable and popular technique for data classification (Cortes and Vapnik, 1995). 
SVM is considered easier to use than many machine learning approaches such as Neural Networks (NN). 
Hence, in this step, SVM classification technique is used to construct an N-dimensional hyperplane separates the 
dataset into two groups, namely, ‘Malware’ and ‘Benign’. For addressing the zero day malware detection, we 
focus on the n-gram feature extraction from API sequences using SVM as the training algorithm. Initially, in 
this step, we separated the data into two: training and testing data sets. We then applied SVM to the training data 
with the goal to produce a model, which is then used to predict the target of the test data. In order to achieve a 
higher accuracy of the predictive model for generalisation, we have used the K-fold cross-validation approach 
for the test data. With the experimental data set, we have adopted a 10-fold cross-validation approach (Swets 
and Pickett, 1982), which is commonly used to estimate how well the trained SVM model is going to perform in 
the future. 
 
For the experiment in this research work, we have used the LIBSVM tool (Chang and Lin, 2001). Both benign 
files and known malicious files are used to train the SVM classifier so that the model could be used to test for 
new obfuscated malware that evades detection from AV scanners. We performed the verification and validation 
of our proposed method for malware detection based on the following standard measures:  
 
1. False Positives (FP): Number of wrongly identified benign code, when the model detects benign file as 
malware. 
2. False Negatives (FN): Number of wrongly identified malicious code, when the model fails to detect the 
malware. 
 
Among the four basic types of kernels used by SVM to map the training vectors to the N-dimensional space, we 
have applied the Radial Basic Function (RBF) kernel.  This is because it can handle the nonlinear cases. We 
have tested the classification performance based on 
2/1   and C  parameters from the equation given below, 
where 0C  is the penalty parameter of error term.    
 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
 
In order to conduct an experimental investigation, we have applied our methodology described in Section VI to 
the dataset collected from honeypots, honeynet project and other sources between July 2009 and November 
2009. We have used 314 executable files in total with 72 benign files and 242 malware infected files that have 
been uniquely named according to their MD5 value.  From our experimental study, we observe that the overall 
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accuracy of our classifier decreases as n increases, as shown in table 1. The trend observed here could be due to 
the specific dataset that was used for the experimental testing. However, any generalisation of the observed 
trend could only be emphatically determined with larger and wider range of datasets. The initial experimental 
result of 96.5% accuracy for unigrams is still very promising as a benchmark for improvements in our future 
research work. Further to this, there are clear trends in both the false positive and false negative values with 
increasing values of n. While unigrams create the better n-gram models for the values shown in table 1, the high 
false negative rate indicates that there is still work to be done on improving this value. 
 
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY AND FUTURE WORK 
 
Our automated system makes use of existing unpacking tools, such as PolyUnpack (Royal et al., 2006), Renovo 
(Kang et al., 2007), OmniUnpack (Martignoni et al., 2007), Ether (Dinaburg et al., 2008), and Eureka (Sharif et 
al., 2008) that are still under research and development.  If the existing tools are unable to unpack a packed 
malware that uses an unknown packing algorithm, this would pose a limitation for Step 1 of our automated 
system. However, our approach from Step 2 onwards would still work in this case by conducting a manual 
unpacking  in Step 1. Another limitation of our system is that Step 3 is based on the latest updates of Microsoft 
with the MSDN library of API call list. We believe this is done up-to-date, as MSDN library forms the main 
reference for the mapping of the API calls in both malware and benign files. 
 
Future work in this area includes techniques to increase the accuracy of the system. The FP rate increases while 
the FN rate decreases as n increases, indicating that it could be possible to use a boosting technique to apply a 
classifier model derived from a higher n value to first determine if a file appears to be malicious, then using a 
model derived from a lower n value so as to more accurately determine if this suspected file is in fact malicious. 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this research work, the behavioural and structural features based on API calls are automatically extracted 
from the binary of a program. The extracted features are subjected to a statistical n-gram analysis to classify a 
program as either malicious or benign effectively with the aid of a supervised SVM machine learning technique. 
In a nutshell, this research provides four main contributions. The first and foremost contribution is, outlining of 
a methodology to extract behaviour features of API calls that relate to various malware behaviour such as i) 
hooking of the system services, ii)  creating or modifying files, iii) getting information from the file for making 
changes about the DLLs loaded by the malware. The second contribution is, providing a statistical analysis of 
the API calls from the programs using n-gram model. In our model, the n-gram analyses the similarities and the 
distance of unknown malware with known behaviour so that obfuscated malware could be detected efficiently. 
The third contribution is, developing a fully-automated tool to unpack, de-obfuscate and reverse engineer the 
program codes without any need for manual inspection of assembly codes. The last contribution is, applying 
SVM machine learning to train the classifier for a robust identification of known as well as unknown malware. 
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Table 1 
Experimental results from SVM classifier by applying n-grams 
 
n-value Accuracy False Positives False Negatives 
1 96.50% 1.91% 1.56% 
2 92.99% 6.36% 0.63% 
3 88.22% 11.46% 0.03% 
4 85.99% 14.01% 0.00% 
5 85.03% 14.97% 0.00% 
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